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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2(1) (1992) and Rule 41, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
The United States District Court for the District of Utah, Central
Division signed an Order of Certification on October 4, 1991
(Appendix A) which was transmitted on October 17, 1991 (Appendix
B) . This Court granted the district court's petition by order
dated December 17, 1991 (Appendix C).
ISSUES PRESENTED
A. Statement of Issues.
As framed by the United States District Court, the issues
are as follows:
(1) Under the Utah Comparative Fault Act, Utah Code
Ann. § 78-27-38, [sic] et. seq. , can a jury
apportion the fault of the plaintiff's
employers that caused or contributed to the
accident although said employers are immune
from suit under Utah Worker's Compensation Act,
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-60 et. seq.
(2) Under the Utah Comparative Fault Act, Utah Code
Ann. § 78-27-38, [sic] et. seq., can a jury
apportion the fault of an individual or entity
that has been dismissed from the litigation but
against whom it is claimed that they have
caused or contributed to the accident.
B. Standard of Appellate Review.
The trial court has yet to rule on these issues.
Pursuant to Rule 41, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this Court
has original jurisdiction to answer questions of Utah law certified
by the federal courts.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The trial court has requested this Court to interpret the
Utah Comparative Fault Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-37 et. seq.
(Sullivan has reproduced the text of this act in Appendix D.)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The nature of the case, the course of the proceedings
below, and the statement of facts material to the resolution of
these issues are set forth in the Order of Certification.
(Appendix A)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In 1986, the Utah Legislature enacted the Comparative
Fault Act embodied in Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-37 through 78-27-43
(1992). As part of that legislation, the Legislature provided that
(1) a "defendant" could only be held liable to a party seeking
damages in proportion to the defendant's "fault," (2) any "defen
dant" could join another party to the action for the purpose of
having that party's "fault" determined, (3) the trial court when
requested should direct the jury to determine the total amount of
damages sustained and the percentage of "fault" attributable to
each "defendant" and each person seeking recovery. (Utah Code Ann.
§§ 78-27-38, 40, and 41 (1992)).
This Court's duty is to determine the Legislature's
intent. After analyzing the legislation in light of well-recog
nized rules of statutory construction, the Court can only conclude
that it would be inappropriate for the jury in this case to
consider the actions of Mr. Sullivan's employers and Denver and Rio
Grande Railroad.
Under the Utah Comparative Fault Act, the jury is to
apportion "fault" among the "defendants" and the person seeking
recovery. The keys to the Act are the definitions found in Utah
Code Ann. § 78-27-37 (1992). Only those persons who are not immune
and are claimed to be liable to the person seeking recovery because
of "fault" can be "defendants". The term "fault" refers only to
actionable breaches of duty. Accordingly, when the jury apportions
"fault" among "defendants" it considers only actionable breaches of
duty among the parties who are not immune.
Since Sullivan's employers are immune under the terms of
the Utah Worker's Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-60 (1992)
and the only duty these employers owe to Sullivan is the payment of
worker's compensation benefits, the employers cannot be "defen
dants" nor do their actions constitute "fault" under the Act. The
jury should not consider the actions or omissions of the Denver and
Rio Grande Railroad, because the trial court has already held as a
matter of law that the railroad is not at "fault" since it did not
breach a duty owed to Sullivan.
The Act is the product of Legislative compromise among
competing interests, and it is not the function of this Court to
second guess the Legislature's wisdom.
ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-38, 39, and 40 (1992) state in
relevant part:
[N]o defendant is liable to any person seeking
recovery for any amount in excess of the
proportion of fault attributable to that
defendant.
The trial court may, and when requested by any
party shall, direct the jury, if any, to find
separate special verdicts determining the total
amount of damages sustained and the percentage
or proportion of fault attributable to each
person seeking recovery and to each defendant.
A person seeking recovery, or any defendant who
is a party to the litigation, may join as
parties any defendants who may have caused or
contributed to the injury or damage for which
recovery is sought, for the purpose of having
determined their respective proportions of
fault.
In the trial court, Trackmobile, Inc. asserted that these statutes
require the trial court to add Sullivan's employers and the Denver
and Rio Grande Railroad on the verdict form in order that the jury
may determine the respective proportions of fault attributable to
these entities. Trackmobile argues that the statutory provisions
provide that the jury is to examine the conduct of all persons
contributing to Sullivan's injuries. However, well-recognized
rules of statutory construction unequivocally demonstrate that the
Legislature specifically intended to limit the jury's examination
to those parties not immune from suit whose actionable breaches of
duty caused the injuries.
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I. THIS COURT'S FUNCTION IS TO DETERMINE THE
LEGISLATURE'S INTENT.
This Court has left no doubt that its principal duty in
interpreting statutes is to determine Legislative intent:
The fundamental consideration which transcends
all others in regard to the interpretation and
application of a statute is: What was the
intent of the Legislature?
Johnson v. State Tax Commission, 411 P.2d 831, 832, 17 Utah 2d 337
(19 66). See also, American Coal Company v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1,
3 (Utah 1984) and Parson Asphalt Products, Inc. v. Utah State Tax
Commission, 617 P.2d 397, 398 (Utah 1980). Application of rules of
statutory construction to the Act demonstrates the Legislature's
intent.
A. Separate Parts of an Act Cannot Be Considered in Isolation
from the Rest of the Act.
In Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d
903 (Utah 1984), this Court, interpreting portions of the Compara
tive Negligence Act, stated:
The best evidence of the true intent and
purpose of the Legislature in an enacting the
Act is the plain language of the Act. The
meaning of a part of an act should harmonize
with the purpose of the whole act. Separate
parts of an act should not be considered in
isolation from the rest of the act. [Citations
omitted.]
Jensen, 679 P.2d at 906. Trackmobile would have this Court unduly
concentrate its attention on Sections 38 and 40. While these
sections state that a "defendant" is liable for his or her share of
"fault," the Court must look elsewhere in the act to determine what
entities are "defendants" and what "fault" is. Section 37 provides
the definitions necessary to make these determinations.
B. Terms Appearing in a Statute Are to Be Construed in Accordance
with the Legislature's Definitions.
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-11 (1986) states:
Words and phrases are to be construed according
to the context and the approved usage of the
language; but technical words and phrases, and
such others as have acquired a peculiar and
appropriate meaning in law, or are defined by
statute, are to be construed according to such
peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition.
[Emphasis added.]
The terms "defendant" and "fault" defined in Utah Code Ann. § 78-
27-37 (1992) are critical to an understanding of the Legislature's
intent. This section states in relevant part:
As used in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-43:
(1) "Defendant" means any person not
immune from suit who is claimed to be
liable because of fault to any person
seeking recovery.
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach
of legal duty, act, or omission proximate
ly causing or contributing to injury or
damages sustained by a person seeking
recovery, including, but not limited to,
negligence in all its degrees, contribu
tory negligence, assumption of risk,
strict liability, breach of express or
implied warranty of a product, products
liability, and misuse, modification or
abuse of a product. [Emphasis added.]
By definition, a person who enjoys an immunity cannot be a "defen
dant" even though that person's acts may have proximately caused
injury. Furthermore, even if a person or entity is not immune,
that person cannot be a "defendant" unless the person's acts
constituted an actionable breach of legal duty to a person seeking
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recovery. The Legislature's intent becomes clear when these
particular meanings are employed in the interpretation of the other
portions of the Act.
C. The Court Presumes That Each Term of the Legislation Is Used
Advisedly.
In Board of Education of Granite School District v. Salt
Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah 1983), the Court noted:
This Court assumes that the terms of a statute
are used advisedly and should be given an
interpretation and application which is in
accord with their usually accepted meanings.
If the Court assumes that undefined terms are used advisedly, this
assumption has even more force in circumstances where the Legisla
ture has specifically defined particular terms in the statute.
With that consideration in mind, the meaning of the Legislature's
language used in Section 39 becomes apparent.
In § 78-27-39, the Legislature provided that the trial
court could, and when requested should, direct the jury to find
special verdicts determining the total amount of damages and the
percentage or proportion of "fault" attributable to each person
seeking recovery and to each "defendant." Hence, the jury is to
consider only the acts of those persons who are not immune and who
are claimed to be liable for an actionable breach of legal duty.
This conclusion is buttressed by other portions of the statute and
the legislative history.
D. Statutes Are to Be Construed so as to Render All Parts Thereof
Relevant and Meaningful.
In Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp. , 609 P. 2d 934 (Utah
1980), this Court stated:
It is to be observed, moreover, that statutory
enactments are to be so construed as to render
all parts thereof relevant and meaningful, and
that interpretations are to be avoided which
render some part of a provision nonsensical or
absurd.
Millett, 609 P.2d at 936. Adopting Trackmobile's interpretation of
the Act would render a portion of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-40 (1992)
nonsensical.
Trackmobile emphasizes the portion of Section 40 which
provides that the maximum amount for which a defendant may be
liable is the proportion of fault attributed to that defendant.
However, the second sentence of that section states:
No defendant is entitled to contribution from
any other person.
If Trackmobile's interpretation were adopted and the jury was
directed to apportion the responsibility among all persons whose
acts proximately caused injury to the plaintiff regardless of their
immunity status, a defendant would never be 1iable for more than
his proportionate share and the prohibition against contribution
would be meaningless. However, this sentence does have meaning if
the jury does not assess the immune party's activities which
proximately caused injury. The Legislature added the last sentence
of Section 40 to ensure that once the apportionment of "fault" has
been made among the "defendants," a "defendant" cannot thereafter
assert a contribution action against an immune party, claiming that
the immune party's acts proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries
and that the "defendant" has paid more than its proportionate
share.
E. Omissions Are Significant.
In Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Anderson, 514 P.2d 217, 30
Utah 2d 100 (1973), the Court emphasized that omissions from a
statute are significant:
It is often said that it should be assumed that
all of the words used in a statute were used
advisedly and were intended to be given meaning
and effect. For the same reasons, the
omissions should likewise be taken note of and
given effect.
Kennecott, 514 P.2d at 219. Here, the Legislature expressly
eliminated from the statute language which would have achieved the
result Trackmobile seeks.
The immediate predecessor of the present legislation was
embodied in Substitute Senate Bill No. 64, a copy of which appears
in Appendix E. As proposed in the bill, § 78-27-39 read:
The trial court may, and when requested by any
party shall, direct the jury, if any, to find
separate special verdicts determining the total
amount of damages sustained and a percentage or
proportion of fault attributable to each person
seeking recovery, to each defendant, and to
each other person whose fault contributed to
the injury or damages. [Emphasis added.]
However, the State and Local Standing Committee reported the bill
out of committee recommending the bill be amended to delete that
portion of § 78-27-39 emphasized above. (Appendix F)
II. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT ALLOW THE JURY TO
CONSIDER THE ACTS OF SULLIVAN'S EMPLOYERS OR
DENVER AND RIO GRANDE RAILROAD.
A* The Acts of Sullivan's Employers Cannot Be Considered by the
Jury in the Apportionment Process Because the Employers are Immune
and They Are Not Fault.
Since, a "defendant" is one who is not immune and is
claimed to be liable because of fault to the plaintiff, the jury
cannot consider the acts of Sullivan's employers. The employers
cannot be "defendants" for two reasons. First, they are immune
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-60 (1988). Second, the
employer's acts cannot constitute "fault," because their liability
to Sullivan does not arise out of an actionable breach of legal
duty. This Court has heretofore held that the only duty owed by an
employer to its employee is a statutory duty provided by the
Worker's Compensation Act. See Oliveras v. Caribou-Four Corners,
Inc., 598 P.2d 1320, 1323 (Utah 1979).
B. The Jury Cannot Consider the Acts and Omissions of Denver and
Rio Grande Railroad Because It Is Not at Fault as a Matter of Law.
Since "fault" is defined as an actionable breach of legal
duty, it necessarily follows that the jury cannot consider the acts
and/or omissions of Denver and Rio Grande Railroad. The trial
court has already granted the railroad summary judgment, holding as
a matter of law that the railroad did not breach a legal duty to
the plaintiff. Now that the trial court has determined this issue
as a matter of law, the jury cannot be given an opportunity to
second guess the trial court.
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III. THE LIABILITY REFORM ACT ACHIEVED A COMPROMISE
BETWEEN COMPETING INTERESTS.
Trackmobile obviously believes that the Legislature's
approach is unfair, because it precludes the jury from considering
the acts of immune parties. However, the enactment represents an
accommodation of competing interests. One author has cogently
stated:
The fairness of any system of comparative
fault, as the beauty of a rose, is in the eye
of the beholder. There is no objective stan
dard by which to judge the fairness of a given
system of comparative fault. The standard
necessarily is subjective, because it includes
a balancing of several objectives. In order to
conclude whether a given system is substan
tially fair or, on the other hand, unreasonably
harsh, one must first define and assign a
priority to the goals to be accomplished in the
implementation of a comparative fault scheme.
Eilbacher, "Non-Party Tortfeasors in Indiana:
The Early Cases," Indiana Law Review, Vol. 21,
p. 413 (1988).
While one of the thrusts of the Act was to address the perceived
inequities in the doctrine of joint and several liability, the
Legislature did not ignore a balancing of competing interests.
Prior to 1986, under joint and several liability, a
tortfeasor bore the risk of paying not only his or her share of the
plaintiff's damages, but also the share of the other tortfeasors
who were impecunious or immune from suit. The 1986 Act shifted the
risk of the impecunious tortfeasor to the plaintiff.
In Trackmobile's view, fairness demands that each
defendant pay only its proportionate share of Sullivan's damages.
However fair that result may seem to the defendants, it would work
a gross inequity on Sullivan.
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Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62 (1988) imposes a lien on the
proceeds of any action brought by an employee against a third
party. This lien is not reduced in any respect by the amount that
the employer's acts contributed to the employee's injuries. If
Trackmobile's interpretation of the Comparative Fault Act were to
prevail, Sullivan's damages would be reduced in proportion to the
amount that the employers' acts contributed to the accident.
Thereafter, Sullivan's recovery would be subject to the full amount
of the employers' lien. Surely the Utah Legislature did not intend
this highly inequitable result.
Under the interpretation of the Act discussed in Point I,
the risk of the immune tortfeasor is shouldered by both the plain
tiff and the non-immune tortfeasors in proportion to their respec
tive fault. This result is consistent with the statutory system in
Indiana which expressly amended its comparative fault statute to
exclude a plaintiff s employer from those non-parties whose fault
can be considered by the jury in the apportionment. The court in
Hill v. Metropolitan Trucking, Inc., 659 F.Supp. 430 (N.D. Ind.
1987) described the Indiana scheme and the reasoning underlying the
legislative amendment as follows:
Under the original version of Indiana's
comparative fault law, a fault-free plaintiff
suing a third party for injuries suffered in
the course of his employment would have faced
the prospect that the jury would apportion
fault to the employer. Because the worker's
compensation laws provide an exclusive remedy,
the plaintiff could not recover the share of
his damages apportioned to his employer.
Further, the employer could enforce his lien on
the share of damages recovered from the third
party, further reducing the plaint if f's
recovery. The 1984 amendments cured this
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ineguity by defining "nonparty" and excluding
the claimant's employer. [Citations omitted;
emphasis added.]
Id. at 433. Since Utah allows the employer to recoup its compensa
tion payments in full from the proceeds of the employee's third
party action, the Legislature has, like Indiana, disallowed
consideration of the employer's actions in apportioning fault thus
eliminating the inequity which would otherwise result in third-
party actions. While there are some, including Trackmobile, who
might disagree with the Legislature's allocation of risk, this
Court has already observed that its function is to interpret the
law and not to second guess the Legislature's wisdom:
We have frequently stated that this Court's
primary responsibility in construing legisla
tive enactments is to give effect to the
Legislature's underlying intent. We have also
said that a statute should be applied according
to its literal wording unless it is unreason
ably confused or inoperable. We must assume
that each term in the statute was used advised
ly by the Legislature and that each should be
interpreted and applied according to its
usually accepted meaning. Where the ordinary
meaning of the terms results in an application
that is neither unreasonably confused, inoper
able, nor in blatant contradiction to the
express purpose of the statute, it is not the
duty of this Court to assess the wisdom of the
statutory scheme. [Citations omitted.]
West Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 1982).
CONCLUSION
The jury is not to consider the acts of parties who are
immune to the plaintiff and/or the acts of parties who are not at
fault as statutorily defined. Since Sullivan's employers are both
immune and not at "fault" and since the trial court has already
13
found as a matter of law that Denver and Rio Grande Railroad did
not breach a duty to Sullivan, this Court should inform the trial
court that the inclusion of these entities on the verdict form
would be improper under Utah law.
DATED this 20th day of April, 1992.
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C.
By
L. Rich Humpherys
M. Douglas Bayly
Attorneys for Kenneth Sullivan
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APPENDIX A
Order of Certification
rPaul M. Belnap, 0279
Victoria K. Kidman, 5302
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant
Trackmobile, Inc.
Sixth Floor Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
KENNETH SULLIVAN
Plaintiff,
vs.
SCOULAR GRAIN COMPANY OF UTAH;
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY;
a Utah corporation, SCOULAR
GRAIN COMPANY, THE SCOULAR
COMPANY, ROBERT O'BLOCK
and GORDON OLCH dba
FREEPORT CENTER ASSOCIATES,
TRACKMOBILE, INC., a Georgia
corporation, formally known as
Whiting Corp., THE DENVER AND
RIO GRANDE WESTERN RAILROAD
COMPANY, a Delaware corporation,
OREGON SHORT LINE RAILROAD
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
and UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY,
a Utah corporation, G.W.
VAN KEPPEL COMPANY, a Missouri
corporation,
Defendants.
ORDER OF CERTIFICATION
Civil No. :7-C-330G
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TO THE UTAH SUPREME COURT:
The United States District Court for the District of Utah, on
its own motion, pursuant to Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, requests the Utah Supreme Court to answer the following
questions of Utah law:
1. Under the Utah Comparative Fault Act, Utah Code
Annot. §78-27-38, et.seq., can a jury apportion the fault
of the plaintiff's employers that caused or contributed
to the accident although said employers are immune from
suit under Utah Workers' Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann.
§ 35-1-60, et. seq.
2. Under the Utah Comparative Fault Act, Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-27-38, et seq., can a jury apportion the fault of an
individual or entity that has been dismissed from the
litigation but against whom it is claimed that they have
caused or contributed to the accident.
The above questions are controlling issues of law in the
above-captioned proceeding pending before the certifying court. It
is crucial that the proper determination as to which parties' fault
may be compared take place before trial, as an erroneous decision
on this issue by the certifying court will certainly result in a
retrial of the case.
"ICISCBbc
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There appears to be no controlling Utah law with respect to
this question. The Utah state courts and the United States
District Courts for the State of Utah have rendered differing
opinions on this question and the same issue is commonly raised in
many personal injury actions involving injuries occurring in the
workplace.
NATURE OF CONTROVERSY, CONTEXT IN WHICH QUESTION AROSE,
AND PROCEDURAL STEPS BY WHICH QUESTION WAS FRAMED
The facts relevant to the determination of the question
certified are as follows:
1. Plaintiff Kenneth Sullivan ("Sullivan") filed this
personal injury action for damages resulting in the loss of his
left arm and left leg from an accident which occurred on the
railroad tracks at the Freeport Center, Clearfield, Utah, on
October 17, 1986. Sullivan was employed by Scoular Grain Company,
Freeport Center Associates and Scoular Grain Company of Utah {a
joint venture comprised of Scoular Grain Company and Freeport
Center Associates), hereafter collectively referred to as "the
Scoular Parties." At the time of his injury plaintiff was assigned
to unload grain from rail cars into warehouses. Sullivan received
approximately $200,000.00 in worker's compensation for his
injuries.
2. Sullivan filed this action against the Scoular Grain
Parties, Union Pacific Railroad Company, Denver & Rio Grande
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Western Railroad Company, Oregon Short Line Railroad Company, Utah
Power St Light Company, Trackmobile, Inc. and G.W. Van Keppel
Company. Plaintiff's complaint alleges claims under the Federal
Employer's Liability Act ("FELA") (45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq.), the
Boiler Inspection Act ("BIA") (45 U.S.C.A. §23), the Safety
Appliance Act ("SAA") (45 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq.), state statutory
laws, contractual duties and state common law claims of negligence
and products liability.
3. In 1989 the Scoular Parties filed motions for summary
judgment. The district court granted defendants' motions for
summary judgment and found the Scoular Parties were not a "common
carrier by railroad" under FELA and dismissed this cause of action.
In addition, the court found that the Scoular Parties were the
"immediate and common law employers of the plaintiff," and were
therefore immune from plaintiff's claim for personal injuries under
the exclusive remedy provision of Utah's Workers Compensation Law,
Section 35-1-62, U.C.A. as amended. The Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals has affirmed the district court's rulings.
4. Defendant Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Company
moved for summary judgment on the following grounds: (!) it was not
plaintiff's employer and could not be liable to plaintiff under
FELA, (2) it was not liable under the Safety Appliance Act or the
Boiler Inspection Act, and (3) it did not owe plaintiff any duty of
101803bc 4
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care with respect to the condition of the tracks at the Freeport
Center. The district court granted this defendant's motion for
summary judgment and dismissed it from the lawsuit.
5. Defendant Utah Power & Light Company moved for a dismissal
on the grounds that the court's dismissal of the Scoular Parties
left no substantial federal question to be decided and the exercise
of pendent jurisdiction over defendant would be unconstitutional.
The district court has not ruled on this defendant's motion to
dismiss.
6. Defendants Union Pacific Railroad Company and Oregon Short
Line Railroad Company moved the district court for a dismissal of
plaintiff's complaint as against them on the grounds that there is
no FELA, BIA or SAA jurisdiction as a matter of law, and that no
diversity jurisdiction exists. The district court dismissed
plaintiff's causes of action based upon the FELA, BIA and SAA but
denied defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of diversity
jurisdiction.
7. The remaining defendants in the case are UP&L,
Trackmobile, G. W. Van Keppel, Union Pacific Railroad Company and
Oregon Short Line Railroad Company.
8. Substantial discovery has taken place in this master and
plaintiff's experts have testified that all named defendants
101SQ3bc
rv (
(including those that have been dismissed) are at fault in more
than one particular.
9. Defendant Trackmobile filed a motion to have the jury
apportion and compare the fault of all named defendants, whether
dismissed or present at trial. This motion is contested by the
plaintiff who claims that only the fault of the nonemployer party
defendants may be compared. The district court has not yet ruled
on this motion.
SUBMISSION OF RECORD
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of this Court, under its
official seal, forward this certification order to the Utah Supreme
Court and file with the Utah Supreme Court any portion of the
record before this Court that may be required by the Utah Supreme
Court.
DATED this JJ^X^day of (^ffi$&\ 1991.
BY THE COURT:
1C;S03bc
. Greene
U/S1. District Court Judge
(APPROVED AS TO FORM^
£y Clare wrtTiam:
Attorney for Defendants Union
Pacific ^and Oregon Shortline
H. James Clegg
Attorney for Utah Power &
ighc Company
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STATE OF UTAH
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December 17, 1991
OEFICE OF THE CLERK
L. Rich Humpherys
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
Attorneys at Lav;
175 South West Temple
Suite 510
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Kenneth Sullivan,
Plaintiff and Respondant,
v. No. 9 10482
Trackmobile, Inc., 87-C-33C'
Defendant and Petitioner,
and,
Secular Grain Company or Utah;
Union Pacific Railroad Company;
a Utah corporation, Scoular Grain
Company, et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
DEC 1 3 1991
:; THE SUPREME COURT
THIS DAY, Petition from the United States District
Court having been heretofore considered, and the Court being
sufficiently advised in the premises, it is ordered that the
Petition from the United States District Court be, and the same
granted.
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APPENDIX D
Utah Comparative Fault Act
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-37 et. seq
wM
*.*-•$*•
7H-27-:^
.II.'DICIAL CODE
78-27-35. Release, settlement, or statement bv injured per
son - "Notice of rescission or disavowal
History: L. 1973. ch. 208, 4 4.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - ,iH Am Jur 2d Release S 14
et seq.
C.J.S. — 76 CJS Release s ;1H et seq
78-27-36. Right of rescission or disavowal of release, set
tlement, or statement by injured person in addi
tion to other provisions.
History: L. 1973. ch. 208. * 5.
Meaning of "this act." - See note follow
ing -ame catchiine ;n notes to ; 7.-i-27-:j*>
78-27-37. Definitions.
As used in Sections 7S-27-,'J7 through 7S-'->7-4'3-
cuL^tefa^mlanS an>' Per^°n not ^mune from suit who j,clamed o be liaole because of fault to any person seeking reeoverv
>2. Fault means any actionable breach of lesal dutv act or omissionproximately causing or contributing to mjurv or damage. usSinS tv aperson seeking recovery, including.- but not limited to ne"igence ,n alt
t, degrees, contributory negligence, assumption of n<k *net liabUiUbreach of express or implied warranty of aproduct, product ab.u and
misuse, modification or abuse of a product ^ability, and
[!•> Person seeking recovery" means anv person seeking danvures or
reimbursement on its own behalf, or on behalf of another"orwhoTit is
authorized to act as legal representative.
19E&& If78-27-37- enatted hy '•• red b-v Uws :97:5' ch- *»• *i- »^<* <°
:-peals and Reenactments.-Laws 19«6 °i'™Imsn.rneru ot ca"ia^ -'"d assumption of
ch. 19*9, - 1repeals former >7^-27^7. a. en- ^^ th<? aDOve secl,on
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MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
NOTES TO DECISIONS
'8-27-:js
Cited ir. Deut.- v. Commercial Sec Bank,
746 P2d 1191 Liar. Ct. App 1987;.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Journal of Contemporary Law. — For A.L.R. — Liabiim [o one struck bv golfball
comment. "The Liability Reform Ac: An Ap- 53 A.L R 4th 2'"2
proach to Equitable Application," .-ee 13 J.
Contemp L >9 • I9S7 •
78-27-38. Comparative negligence.
The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone bar recovery by that
person. He may recover from any defendant or group of defendants whose
fault exceeds his own. However, no defendant is liable to any person seeking
recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributable to
that defendant.
History: C. 1953, 78-27-118. enacted by L.
198fi. ch, 199, 5 2.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986,
ch 199. i 2 repeals former • 7s-27-3h. as en
acted bv Laws 197.?, ch 209, ; 2. relating to
special verdicts, and reenacts the above sec
tion
Cross-References. — Product Liability Act.
manufacturer or seller not liable if alteration
or modification of product after sale is substan
tial contriDutir.L' cause o: irrury, ; 78-15-5
Skier? not to make claim against or recover
from ski area operator for injury resulting from
anv inherent risk ot' .-kimg. ; 78-27-03.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Analysis
Assumption >if risk
Bailment
Causation.
Dramsnops
Jury instruction-
Last ca-ar cr.ance
Open and oovious danger.
Unit method of determining negligence.
Wrongful death.
Cited.
Assumption of risk.
"Assumption of risk." i e , risk of a known
dancer vountanly assumed, may amount to a
lack of due care constituting neiiiicence; where
such is the case and the party assuming the
risk :s the plaintiff in an action governed by
comparative negligence statute, he is charge
able with contributory negligence and is liable
to nave his recovery reduced or denied in accor
dance witn its provisions. Rigtrup v. Straw
berry Water Users Assn. 563 P 2d 1247 (Utah
1977', overruled on other grounds, Moore v.
Burton Lumber & Hdwe. Co., 631 P.2d 865
•Utah 19-U
Assumption of risk ain^uage is not appropri
ate to describe the various concepts previously
dealt witn under that terminology but is to be
treated, in it.- secondary -en.-e. as contributor.
negligence: when the issue is raised attention
should be focused <in whether a reasonably pru
dent man :n the exercise of due care would
have incurred the n-k. de.-pite hi- knowledge
of it, and if so. whether he would nave con
ducted himself :n the manner in which the per
son seeking to recover acted in light of all the
surrounaini: circumstance-, including the ap
preciated risk: then, if the unreasonableness m
the person seeking to recover is viewed to be
less than that of tne person from whom reco\-
ery is sought, anv damages allowed should be
diminished in proportion to the amount of neg
ligence attributable to the person recoverini:
Jacobsen Constr. Co. v. Structo-Lite Engg,
Inc. 619 P.2d 306 'Utah 19mj-
As used in ^ 78-27-37, "assumption of risk"
is a voluntary and unreasonable exposure to a
known danger. Moore v. Burton Lumber &
Hdwe. Co.. 631 P.2d 865 .Utah 19SU.
Assumption of risk language is not appropri
ate in an instruction under comparative negli
gence -tatutes Stephens v Henderson, 741
P 2d 952 'Utah 19>-7' applying statute in ef
fect prior to 19^1 •
The assumption of risk doctrine has been ex-
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MISCELLANEOUS PROVISION: 7«-27-:J9
Brigham Young Law Review. — The
MerKt'r '-'' Cuniparaii'.e fauit Principles with
Strict Liahiiitv in Utah Muihcnn v Ingvr^all-
frndCo.h'-l ii YU L P.- -64.^6
pamaee Apportionment in Accounting Mal
practice Action- The Role :>f Comparative
fault. IP!1" B YUL K^ 949
Journal of Contemporary Law. - Lor
comment. "The Liability Reform Act An Ap
proach to Li; a: table Application." 13 J.
Contemn L >9 19*7
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5,13 Am Jur 2d Neirhyence
{ 1128 et '-eq
C.J-S. — 65A CMS Negligence i 169 et
seq.
A.L.R. — Commarative neglmence rule
where rm.-onduct ••• I three >,r m<;re persons is
involved. - A i, R ia . --
Retro-Dective ai;o..cat ion ( : -i.iti' statute
substitutir.L' rule ••: comnaratr, e ne<; licence for
that of contributor* neL'iicence. 57 A.L R..3d
1-138
Indemn.'.-, or contnnution netween . oint tort
feasors on ba-i- •>' relative fault. 55 A I..R 3d
184
Modern deveioomen: ot comparative negli
gence doctrine tuning applicability to negli
gence actions generally. > A.L R.3d 339.
Application ol comparati vt- m'L'i;L'ence dor-
(nne, genera.lv. s6 A I. R !;i 12'ib
Comparative negliirenc doctrine applied to
act ion- ha-eo on -tnct . kindit1. in tort. 9
A.L.R.4tn 653.
Rllect ot adoption ol comparative negligence
rules on assumption 'it risk and contributory
negligence. 16 A L.R 4th 7uu
Commercial renter.- :ieLr:itience liabihtv for
cu-tomer - per-on.il in uric-. 57 A.I. K.4lh
I 18(1
Liability to one struck in golf' club, i^'-l
A.L R 4th 221
Liabihtv tor lniury incurred in "Deration of
power L'olt cart. 66 A L.R -lib 622
Tort liabihtv fnr h::kihw v-asher- :niurv or
death, (in A.L R 4th 2"7
Comparative !ault c,Jcuiut ae! iii net recov
itv by anp.vmg perceno^v •>: plaintiff- fault
before or alter subtracting am"unt oi -e!tie-
men t h\ ies- 1ban ,-.\ I |uirit tortleasnr- i 1
A.L.R.4th ilil'S.
Rescue doctrine applicability and anplica
tion of comparative neghijer.ce principles 75
A L R.-ltn -75
Key Numbers. — Ni-trlieence -j 97 et -et]
78-27-39. Separate special verdicts on total damages and
proportion of fault.
The trial court may, and when requested by any party shall, direct the jury,
if anv, to find separate special verdicts determining the total amount of dam
ages sustained and the oercentage or proportion of fault attributable to each
person seeking recovery and to each defendant.
History: C. 1953, 78-27-39, enacted by L. acted bv Laws 1973. c;: 2''19. ; 5, relatim: lo
1986. ch. 199. * 3. contribution amoneyunt t^rtteasur-. and reen-
Kepeals and Reenactments. — Laws 19»6, acts the aoove section,
ch. 199. • 5 repeal- firmer : 7S-27-39, as en-
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Analysis
Jury inductions
Cited
Jury instructions.
If requested, a trial court must inform the
jury of the leirai consequences oi apportioning
to the plaint::! 50'' or more of the neL'liL'ence it
finds in a comparative ne^'ueence ca.-e. ii the
effect of such an ir.-truct:"n will not be to con
fuse or rni-lea.d the lury Lhxia: \ Stewart. 65.s
P.2d 591 Utah I 9r<2
Cited m Reeves v. Centiie. Vi3 P.2d 111
'Utah 199U
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78-27-40
-JUDICIAL CODE
78-27-40. Amount of liability limited to proportion of fault
— No contribution.
Subject to Section 78-27-38, the maximum amount for which a defendant
may be liable to anv person seeking recovery is that oercentage or proportion
ol the damages equivalent to the percentage or proportion offault attributed
to that defendant. Xo defendant is entitled To contnbutior
person.
History: C. 1953. 78-27-H), enacted by L.
19H6, eh. 199. * 4.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986.
ch 0)9. ;- t repeal.- former : 7-1-27-40. as en
acted »v Laws 1973. ch 209. ^ 4, relating to
-ett.enier.t ov a •oim tortteasor. and reenacts
the above -ect ion.
>n from anv other
Cross-References. — Er.f-.rcement of con
tribution and reimbursement. Rale- of Civil
Procedure. Rifp >•,-.<. h •
•Joint mil.nation.-. ; 15-4-1 -t -eo
NOTES TO DECISIONS
A.VAL'. SIS
Applicability of -ection
Indemnuv uimract
Plaintiff- minor cnilc as 'oint tortfeasor.
Wnrker- compensation
Cited.
Applicability of section.
A statute, siicn a.- this -ection. eiiminatinL-
oinl anu -everal liabihtv mav not be applied to
.niuries occurring prior !o its effective date.
'A here the injuries- incurred on November .s.
19M. ,;nd trie Liunihtv Reform Act was not
effective untii Apni 2.-\ 11-Kn. the trial court
was correct ;n noidim: that the Liabihtv Re-
(orni Act aid not aupiv. Stephen.-, v Henderson
741 P2d :;52 Utan 19>7
Indemnity contract.
n-.e former comparative negligence provi
sion- did not invalidate an "mployers indem
nity contract witn a :hird party whereby em
ployer agreed to indemnity the third party
agam-t churns an-mg out 4 injuries to the em-
plover- einoi jvee- Shei. (>ii 15)
Brins-ernon-SiLmu: Drilling Co.. 65" P Ud 1187
:l'tah 19M..
Plaintiffs minor child as joint tortfeasor.
Where plaint iff v. as av. arced o 'augment m
action against tl c.ciV-ndant to recover ^ne prop
erty .o-s sUst.iineu a.- tat- result ol a collision
between autorr.rm.es . 'crated bv aefendant
and th.e mim-r unemanciDated aau,jnter ot the
plaintiff, anu wb-re tae .uu-hterS negligence
contribute!: t" trie Drntiertv O-.- -u-;ained bv
her tamer, trie inir.i.r d.aur.ter was a 'oint tort
feasor anu habie t i cie de^r.d^nt fur contribu
tion Bishon v .VeNen. 6.,2 P 2d -6-1 :Utaa
1;is:
Workers' compensation.
Employer cannot be .i yarn tortfeasor as to
an imur> •c his empiov.-e ..o'.ered bv the Work
men - Compensation A/', ''art:-, v Harmon
Elec . Inc. 552 P 2d 117 Utan 197^. Phillips
v Union Pac R R . 614 P Jd 155 l_tunl9»U
Cited :n War-en •. H r.da M;hor Co . 669 F
Supp 565 D I 'rjj; l'.-7
COLLATERAL REEERE.VKS
Rrigham Young Law Review. - Utah Al
low.- Contribution Against Cotortfeasor De
spite Immunity from Direct Suit: Bishop v.
SieL-en. 1982 R V U. L. Rev 429.
Journal of Contemporary [.aw. — Com
ment, The Liability Retorm Act: An Approach
to Equitable ApDuca:.on. 13 3 Contemp L 89
19s7o
A.L.R. — Ru-ht .i; tortfeasor imtiailv caus
ing injury to recover indemnity ar contribution
from medical attendant aggravating injury or
causing now uvurv m cour-e o: treatment 72
A.L.R.4th 251
Products luirjihtv -elier? right to inner- :y
from manufacturer. 79 A.L R.4th 278.
4,'34
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISION:
"8-27-4:1
78-27-41. Joinder of defendants.
A person seeking recovery, or any defendant who is a party to the litigation,
may win as parties any defendants who may have caused or contributed to the
injury or damage for which recovery is sought, for the purpose of having
determined their respective proportions of fault.
History: C. 1953. 78-27-41. enacted by L. acted by E.:w- 1975. O: 209. : 5, relating •-,
198b. ch. 199. ; a. right.-ot contribution and mdemnitv. and reen-
Repeals and Reennetments. — Laws 198(i, act, the above -ection
ch. 199, t 5 repeals !ormer ; 7.---27-4L as en-
A.L.R. - Produ:
incemnit1. :.-• n. it
27s
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
•:- imbi.itv seller'- right to
a:u;;Lic:ure:. 79 A.L R -lib
78-27-42. Release to one defendant does not discharge
other defendants.
A release given by a person seeking recovery to one or more defendants does
not discharge any other defendant unless the release so provides.
History-: C. 1953. 78-27-12. enacted by L. acted by Law- 1973, ch 209. •- 6. relating to
198m ch. 199, ; «. relea-e ot imnt tortteasnr- and a reduction ot
_Repeals and Keenactments. -Laws 198th da:m. and reenacts the above -ection.
ch 199. -v n reneal- former - 7s-2,-42, as en-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. -Jur. 2d. — 5n Am -Jur tid Reiea.-e ^ 5.3 against one mint tortfeasor as relei.se of'other.-.
«'t -•- 40 A L.R.3d 11M
C.J.S. — 75 IMS Release ; 5s et seq. Release .if.me nech^entlv treating injury as
A.L.R. - Tortfeasor- jenerai release of co- aifecting liability of one orminallv responsible
tortfea-or a- atieCtir.L' former's ritrht of contn- for miurv. 34 A.L.R3<: '59
bution aLm:n.-t coturtieasor, 3-1 A L.R 3d 1374 Vahduv and effect of armeement with one
Release ot one responsible tor iniurv as af- cotorttea-nr setting a.-ide hi.- nu.ximum liabii-
tecting liabihtv of pnvsician or surgeon tor ity and providing for reduction or extinguish-
neL'ager.t treatment of iraury. 39 A.L.R.3d 260. ment thereof relative to recovery against non-
Voluntary pavrnenf .nto court of judgment agreeing coiortfeusor. 65 A.L.R.3d bU2.
78-27-43. Effect on immunity, exclusive remedy, indem
nity, contribution.
Nothing in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-42 afTects or impairs any com
mon law or statutory immunity from liability, including, but not limited to.
governmental immunity as provided in Title 63. Chapter 30, and the exclu
sive remedy provisions of Title 35, Chapter 1. Nothing in Sections 78-27-37
through 78-27-42 affects or impairs any right to indemnity or contribution
arising from statute, contract, or agreement.
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Liability Reform Act
Substitute Senate Bill No. 64
1 1
15
IS
17
13
19
20
21
23
S. 3. No. 64
(LIABILITY REFORM AC"
1936
GENERAL SESSION
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A d crcv e d f:r -"-'-'-- ^ *~
Dar.e n •_•:'_ ^
By Haver. J. Barlcv
ac.< M. •a — - ^ ».
' = i- j - - -. -
Warren E.
Glace M. 3c/
Elder. A. M-r.ev
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-Tchn ?. Hc:r.:ren
rtavr.e _. Sar.dber
AN ACT RELATING TO THE JUDICIAL CCDE; MODIFYING PROVISIONS
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE; SPECIFYING DUTIES OF JURORS
ABOLISHING JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY AND RIGHTS
AMONG DEFENDANTS; REQUIRING FAULT OF DEFENDANTS TO 3:
ONE TRIAL; AND DEFINING CERTAIN TERMS.
THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH CCDE ANNOTATED 1953 A3 ?r,•
— -AI • \ '•J TO
AND JL ^ o lS ;
>- -.. i. a -3
.._
L-r
'ERMINED IN
AMENDS:
72-27-53, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 166, LAWS OF UTAH 1973
.' •-> ? v - \
~. z z.. -A C T S :
SUBSTITUTE S. 3. No. 64 Cl-3>:6 -:54 ?M
1 72-27-37, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 209, LAWS OF UTAH 1973
2 73-27-33, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 209, LAWS OF UTAH 1973
3 73-27-39, AS ENACTED 3Y CHAPTER 209, LAWS OF UTAH 1973
4 73-27-40, AS ENACTED 3Y CHAPTER 209, LAWS OF UTAH 1973
5 73-27-41, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 209, LAWS OF UTAH 1973
6 73-27-42, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 209, LAWS OF UTAH 1973
7 73-27-43, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 209, LAWS OF UTAH 1973
3 Re it er. acted bv 7. he Legislature of the state of Utah:
9 Sectien 1. Section 73-27-37, Utan Cede Annotated 1953, as er.s-r.ed by
10 Chapter 209, Laws of Utah 1973, is repealed and reer.actec to reac:
11 7S-27-37. As used in Sections 73-27-37 through 75-27-43:
12 (1) "Defendant" means anv oerscn not immune from suit who :s claimed
13 to be liable because of fault to anv person seeking recover;/.
14 (2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty, ict. :r
15 omission proximately causing or contributing to injury or damages sustained
16 bv a oerscn seeking recovery, including, but not limited t: , negligence '-n
17 all its degree s, contribute ry negligence, assumption c: risk. strict
1S liability, breach of express or implied '-.'arranty of a product, products
19 liability, and misuse, medification or abuse of a product.
20 (3) "Person seeking recover;/" means any person seeking damages or
21 reimbursement on its own ber.alf. or on behalf of another tor -".cm it is
22 authorized to act as legal repressr.tat:vs .
23 Section 2. Section 73-27-3 3, Utan <,cda Annotated 195 3, as enacted by
24 Chapter 2C9, Laws of Utah 1973, is repealed and reenactec to read:
l)iU SI
SUBSTITUTE S. 3. No. 64
'-"•-JC / • = ' ~:\4
The fault of a oerscn seeking r ° c o v*3 *~v
recovery bv that oerscn. He may recover from anv defendant
defendants whose fault exc eec s his own. However, n;
anv person seeking recovery for anv amount in excess of tr.e orpccrt •' -- of
fault attributable to that defendant.
Section 3. Section 73-27-39, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by
Chapter 209, Laws of Utah 1973, is repealed and reer.actec to reac:
"S-2R--39 . The trial
iu ii-;.
direct
:u r , .a v, ana wn e n r e o u e s t e c b v anv
tr, e ;ury. it anv, to find secarate special verdicts be
a _ o n e oar
ot
is -lao.e to
.0 total amour, t of damages sustained and the percentage
16
19
20
attributable to each person see/, in z recovery, to each ££-=-,--_.- ,, „„
eacn other person whose fault contributed to the in :urv or ramaze s.
Section 4. Section 73-27-40, Utah Code Annotated 1933, as enacted bv
Chapter 209, Laws of Utah 19 73, is repealed and reer.actec ;: reac:
73-27-40. Subject to Section 73-27-33. the maximum amount -*p- -,•;-•- r-
defendant may be liable to anv person seeking recover-/ is ----
or proportion of the damages equivalent to the cereen
fault attributed to that defendant. Ho defendant is entitled -p
contribution from any cther person.
Section 5. Section 73-27-41, Utah Code Annotated 1952. as enacted by
Chapter 209, Laws of Utan 1973, is repealed and reenacted to reac:
73-27-4 1. a person seeking recover;/, or anv defer..
to tr.e :. 111 ga;lor,, may ;o in as parties anv defendan'
or contributed to the i- •••- -,-
;e r u e r. i a g e
i s a
s -.•.o mav .cave causea
age tor w n i c n recover-.' is sought. tor
i'jr:ose ot having determined
'esoective or
(JOi 52
13
16
17
-, Q
. u
19
20
21
22
23
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section Section 73-27-42, Utah Code Annotated 195u, as enacted oy
Chapter 209, Laws of Utah 1973, is repealed and reenacted to read:
72-2T-4.2 . A release given bv a person seeking recovery to one or mere
defendants does not discharge anv ether defendant unies s — O •* 3 • 31C3
provides.
Section 7. Section 73-27-43, Utah Code Annotated 1953. as enacted ey
Chapter 209, Laws of Utan 1973, is repealed and reenacteo to reao:
73-2^-43. Nothing in Sections "3-27-37 th rouge, "3-2"-42 sttects :r
impairs anv common law or statutory immunity trcm liaei.itv. ::.:
n' limited to, governmental immunity as proviaed in
the exclusive remedy ore vis ions of Chapter 1, Tit.e 3o .
> T ' 0 0 = 3-27--3 7 througn 73-27-4.2 affeets or impairs
•ndemni'v or contribution, arising from statute, contract, or a
ah Code Annotated -3;3. asSection 3. Sect.on 73-.: /-1> J , -tar.
Chapter 166, Laws of Utan 1979, is amended te reac:
78-2 7-5 3. Notwithstanding anytnmg in [^-""- Se_
througn "3-27-43 to the contrary, no skier [shari-J may m.
rv resultingagainst, or recover from, any ski area operator tor injur;,
anv of the inherent risks of skiing.
f any provision of Sections 73-2 7-3" througn•section. u>
t.".e application ot anv crovi s i these sections t j anv p e r s •
circumstance, is held '. r.va: ic , remaining provisices of those sections
o e given e 11 e c t w '. t n • v: s i c n
OOi S3
L
':?>'
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Section 10. This act takes effect uoon aDoreval bv the governor, or
:he dav following the constitutional time 1i.mi t of - _- . Sec.
without the governor'5 signature. or in the case of a veto, the date of
veto override.
APPENDIX F
Liability Reform Act
Amendment to Substitute Senate Bill No. 64
SENATE CHAMBER
STATE OF" UTAH
3ALT LAKE CITY
February 4, 1935
. President:
The State and '--^1 c---.^ -,,„ _
— ••— — . _ - ^.. — _.. or >_ c m, m i tia ° ~ ~ •••-••-.
^.d. jo. „.,, _rt3 y -Z7ZRM ACT, by Senator Ha
•low et al, has carefully considered the hi" —-
•c: committee with the recommendation that t.te or— —
- ... wc^/ a,._ ar.c -cat Substitute c. =. \'~
-ace the original till.
Substitute S.3. ;;c. 64 to be amended as fellows
1• Pace 3, 1i-e 1':
After "recover'' ' delete ",
-s..-:;5 it
2. Pace
- I - — .. e
After "de fo-
Pace 3, line 12:
-i.ee . 2, delete one res"
/ anc i r.se r ~ " = - -
delete the res- o~ -'-a '••
a -• a *-
